Wikileaks banking blocked still

It seems Visa and Mastercard are not their own masters but can be pressured by 'other agencies', just like eBay's Paypal.

Visa and mastercard are apparently happy to provide services to the notorious Klu Klux Klan but not to Wikileaks.

Here are some links of interest:

usatoday

Banking Blockade

Social Times

The Unknown Prisoners of Guantanamo (Part Three)

One of the great publicity coups in WikiLeaks’ recent release of classified military documents relating to the majority of the 779 prisoners held at Guantánamo, as I explained in the first part of this five-part series, was to shine a light on the stories of the first 201 prisoners to be freed from the prison between its opening, in January 2002, and September 2004, when 35 prisoners were repatriated to Pakistan, and 11 were repatriated to Afghanistan.

A handful of these 46 prisoners were cleared for release as a result of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, a one-sided process, which ran from August 2004 to March 2005 and was designed to rubber-stamp the prisoners’ prior designation as “enemy combatants,” who could continue to be held indefinitely. Information about the 558 prisoners who passed through the CSRT process (PDF) was first made publicly available in 2006, but no records have ever been publicly released by the US government which provide any information whatsoever about the 201 released, or approved for release before the CSRTs began, except for a prisoner list released in May 2006 (PDF), which contains the names, nationalities, and, where known, dates of birth and places of birth for 759 prisoners (all but the 20 who arrived at Guantánamo between September 2006 and March 2008).

In the years since the documents relating to the CSRTs were released (and information relating to their annual follow-ups, the Administrative Review Boards, or ARBs), I attempted to track down the stories of these 201 men, and managed, largely through successful research that led to relevant media reports, interviews and reports compiled by NGOs, to discover information about 112 of these prisoners, but nothing at all was known about 89 others (except for their names, and, in some cases, their date of birth and place of birth). With the release of the WikiLeaks files, all but three of these 89 stories have emerged for the very first time, and in this series of articles, I am transcribing and condensing these stories, and providing them with some necessary context. The first 17 stories were in Part One, the second 17 were in Part Two, and the third 17 are below.

Please note that the overwhelming majority of these 86 prisoners were Afghans or Pakistanis, and that many were assessed by the US military as “being neither affiliated with AI-Qaida nor a Taliban leader,” of having “no intelligence value to the United States,” and of posing “no threat” or “a low threat to the US, its interests or its allies.” That last reference — to them posing “a low threat” — ought to alert readers to the problems with the classification system at Guantánamo, as many of the cases involve patently innocent people seized by mistake, who, nevertheless, were referred to as “a low threat” rather than as no threat at all.

On their return, the majority of the Afghans were released outright, whereas the Pakistanis were mostly imprisoned for many months before they too were granted their freedom (see here for an article from Pakistani newspaper the Nation in June 2005 describing the release of 17 prisoners repatriated from Guantánamo in September 2004, some of whom are listed below).

Abdullah Edmondada (ISN 360, Afghanistan) Released March 2003

Born in 1960 in Kandahar, and described, in his assessment on December 5, 2002, as Abdullah Bayanzay, he was, according to the US authorities, “selected from a lottery” in his village “to support the Taliban, which required a regular inflow of conscripts to support their operation.” As the assessment also noted, “The village reluctantly supplied conscripts to the Taliban because the village elders understood that there would be harsh consequences if they failed to comply.” As a result, at the end of September 2001, he was flown in a cargo plane to Kunduz, in north eastern Afghanistan, “along with about 50 other recruits,” and taken to the Taliban command center.” There, because Edmondada “was older than the other recruits, he requested an easy assignment and was assigned to guard a room at the command center where the recruits slept and stored their personal belongings and ammunition.”

Two months later, when Kunduz fell to the Northern Alliance, he “and about 450 soldiers were loaded onto trucks” and taken to Yanghareq, to the north west of Kunduz, where they surrendered along with several thousand others. He was then transported to Sheberghan prison near Mazar-e-Sharif, surviving what has become known as the “convoy of death” because an unknown number of prisoners (but almost certainly numbering in the thousands) died en route, mostly through suffocating in the container trucks that were used to transport them.

It was also stated, as a reason for his transfer to Guantánamo on June 11, 2002, that he was transferred “because of his possible knowledge of Taliban activities in the Kunduz area under Taliban commander Abdul Basiv,” but, as I explained in a recent article, How to Read WikiLeaks’ Guantánamo Files when the Guantánamo files were first published, as part of my work liaising between WikiLeaks and its media partners):

[T]he “Reasons for Transfer” included in the documents, which have been repeatedly cited by media outlets as an explanation of why the prisoners were transferred to Guantánamo, are, in fact, lies that were grafted onto the prisoners’ files after their arrival at Guantánamo. This is because, contrary to the impression given in the files, no significant screening process took place before the prisoners’ transfer. As a senior interrogator who worked in Afghanistan explained in a book that he wrote about his experiences, every prisoner who ended up in US custody had to be sent to Guantánamo, even though the majority were not even seized by US forces, but were seized by their Afghan and Pakistani allies at a time when substantial bounty payments for “al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects” were widespread.

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [360] is assessed as not affiliated with Al-Qaida nor as being a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [He] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations or in the course of his detention. Based on the above, detainee does not pose a future threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the commander of Guantánamo at the time, recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Shaibjan Torjan (ISN 362, Afghanistan) Released March 2003

Born in 1977 and described, in his assessment on September 27, 2002, as Sahibjan Torjan, he was an extremely unwilling Taliban conscript. As noted in his assessment, “The Taliban came to [his] home and asked for a male volunteer to join them. The only other male of military age was his father, so [he] volunteered for service.” Although the Taliban then “placed him with a fighting unit in Kunduz,” he “refused to fight,” and was imprisoned for 30 days. He was then “used as a driver,” prior to his capture by Northern Alliance forces at the fall of Kunduz. He was also, presumably, another survivor of the “convoy of death.” It was also stated, as a spurious reason for his transfer to Guantánamo on May 4, 2002, that he was transferred “because of his knowledge of Taliban facilities in several areas in northern Afghanistan.”

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [362] is assessed as not affiliated with Al-Qaida nor as being a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [He] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations or in the course of his detention. Based on the above, detainee does not pose a future threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Michael Dunlavey, the commander of Guantánamo at the time, recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Shai Jahn Ghafoor (ISN 363, Afghanistan) Released March 2003

He was born in 1969 and it was stated, in his assessment on February 8, 2003, that he was a farmer and day labourer in a village in Helmand province, and that, on September 9, 2001, he was “forcibly conscripted by the Taliban to work as a supply driver in Taloqan,” in northern Afghanistan. As the assessment explained, he “drove a pickup truck carrying foodstuffs and miscellaneous supplies from a bazaar outside of Taloqan to within two miles of the front lines,” although he “did not transport ammunition or weapons and saw no foreign troops in the area where he dropped off the supplies.” Another survivor of the “convoy of death,” he was sent to Guantánamo on June 11, 2002 on the spurious basis that it was “because of [his] knowledge of Taliban recruitment and travel routes, and of details regarding Sheberghan prison” — in other words, details of how he was abused by both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [363] is assessed as not affiliated with Al-Qaida nor as being a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [He] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations or in the course of his detention. Based on the above, detainee does not pose a future threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Mohammed Kakar (ISN 364, Afghanistan) Released May 2003

Born in 1977, and described, in his assessment on March 8, 2003, as Muhamed Raz-Muhamed Kakar, he apparently “dodged Taliban conscription” twice before his capture and his pointless transfer to Guantánamo. On the second occasion, he was jailed “for being a conscientious objector” and his father arranged with an elder of the village in Uruzgan province, where he lived, to “pay 20,000,000 Afghanis for a man to take [his] place during this period of conscription.” As a result, he was freed from jail and “returned to operating the family store.” However, on October 27, 2001, the Taliban returned, taking him, via Kandahar and Kabul, to Kunduz, where he “and four other conscripts that volunteered were used as guards at a petroleum site,” their main duty being “to prevent theft of petroleum and protect the depot from arson.” Another survivor of the “convoy of death,” he was sent to Guantánamo on June 11, 2002 on the spurious basis that it was “because of his knowledge of a Taliban petroleum site that he guarded near Kunduz.”

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [364] is assessed as not affiliated with Al-Qaida nor as being a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [He] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations or in the course of his detention. Based on the above, detainee does not pose a future threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Sabit Layar (ISN 365, Afghanistan) Released July 2003

Born in 1981 and described, in his assessment on April 26, 2003, as Sabitullah Allayar, he was another unwilling Taliban conscript. According to his assessment, “In October 2001, [his] father warned him of the Taliban coming to the village again to collect conscripts. Detainee left his home and while sneaking around the wall of his home Taliban officials stopped him” and immediately took him to Kabul, via a base near Kandahar, en route to Kunduz. However, “[a]s the vehicles were being organised, the following morning, detainee escaped.” He then found a bus driver who was prepared to let him ride on top of the bus for free, but he was seized at a Taliban checkpoint near Ghazni, and taken back to Kabul “where he was beaten repeatedly for having escaped conscription.” Two days later, he was sent to Kunduz, where he was made to guard “a depot area away from the Kunduz headquarters.” It was also noted that his responsibilities “included the call to prayer.”

As Kunduz was bombed and “most of the group attempted to hide on the other side of the village where there was less death and destruction,” he ended up walking with others in his group to the desert at Yanghareq, where they surrendered to Uzbek soldiers of the Northern Alliance, and, after two days tied up, were sent to Sheberghan as part of the “convoy of death.” On June 10, 2002, he was sent to Guantánamo on the spurious basis that it was “because of his knowledge of Taliban operations in and around Kunduz and Kabul just prior to the surrender of Taliban forces in November 2001.”

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [365] is assessed as not affiliated with Al-Qaida nor as being a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [He] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations or in the course of his detention. Based on the above, detainee does not pose a future threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Hazrat Sangin Khan (ISN 366, Afghanistan) Released March 2004

He was born in 1977, and it was stated, in his assessment on August 9, 2003, that he “claim[ed] to have been a cab driver forced into the service of Taliban Commander Sher Ali,” who “worked with the Taliban as a driver for three years before he and his unit surrendered to [Northern Alliance commander General] Dostum’s forces at Mazar-e-Sharif.” The spurious reason for his transfer to Guantánamo was “because of his knowledge of senior Taliban personnel and service to the Taliban,” and, despite his instance that he was an unwilling conscript, this affiliation counted against him in Guantánamo, where it was “assessed that [he] may have knowledge regarding mid to senior-level Taliban members,” which “may be of value to the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), a critical ally in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism.”

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force concluded that he was “assessed as being a low-level member of the Taliban,” and it was stated that “sources not available now may be available in the future to confirm, deny, or change his intelligence value and threat assessment.” As of August 2003, however, he was assessed as being “of low intelligence value,” and of posing “a low threat risk to the US, its interests and allies,” and Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for transfer to the control of another government for continued detention.”

Juma Khan (ISN 443, Afghanistan) Released November 2003

He was born in 1972, and, according to his assessment on August 9, 2003, he “claimed he was tricked into accompanying a man who later turned him in as a member of the Taliban for money.” He further explained that this man, Agha, “a loyal Dostum follower,” also told civilians in the Mazar-e-Sharif area that US forces “paid civilians $2,000 USD when they surrendered as Taliban fighters.” This — which I have never heard about before – is a ploy that ought to have been perceived as self-defeating, but perhaps, in the desperation of poor, war-torn Afghanistan, it seemed like a good idea. Whatever the case, Khan claimed that he “voluntarily surrendered to US forces” and was subsequently taken to Kandahar and Guantánamo.

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force concluded that he was “assessed as not being a member of the Taliban or of al-Qaida,” and that he was “of low intelligence value,” and also posed “a low threat to the US, its interests and its allies.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for release and repatriation to his country of origin.” Mohammed Nasim (ISN 453, Afghanistan) Released March 2004

Born in 1972, he was described, in his assessment on November 22, 2003, as having been “diagnosed with chronic hepatitis B,” although it was also stated that he was “otherwise in good health.” When it came to the allegations against him, the US authorities were clearly floundering. According to Nasim’s account, Pakistani police came to his home in mid-December 2001 and arrested him, transporting hi to Bagram, and then to Guantánamo “because of suspected involvement with the Taliban.”

However, according to the US authorities, he had “not been forthright in his interviews,” and had “attempted to create a perception that he [was] uneducated, illiterate, and nothing more than an innocent ‘businessmen,’” even though, according to “[analytical research," he was "suspected to be the Taliban Deputy Minister of Education." Alarmingly, it was also noted that, according to this same process of "research," he was "maybe the former deputy to General Abdul Rashid Dostum," described as "the leader of Jumbish-I-Milli (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), who defected to the Taliban in November 1998," even though, by 2001, Dostum was working with the Northern Alliance, and, as well as spearheading the "convoy of death," was responsible, after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, for handing over at least 10 percent of the total number of prisoners who ended up at Guantánamo.

In its assessment, based on this ludicrously flawed and/or vague analysis, the Joint Task Force concluded that he was "assessed as being a possible high ranking member of the Taliban," who "may be of intelligence value to the United States," and who, as a result, "poses a high threat to the US, its interests or its allies." and should continue to be detained. It was also noted that, "in the interest of national security and pursuant to an agreement between the CITF and JTF GTMO Commanders, CITF stated it would schedule this case for their Behavioral Sciences ConsultationTeam to re-evaluate the threat assessment," and either because of this, or a decision higher up, Nasim was released four months later.

Mohammed Sadiq Adam (ISN 454, Uzbekistan) Released March 2004

Listed as an Uzbek, he was actually an Afghan national, born in 1973, and in his assessment on November 24, 2003, in which he was described as Mohammed Siddiq Adam, it was stated that he claimed that he "worked for the Taliban as a truck driver," and that, "[o]n the day he was captured, he claimed to have been traveling on his normal route and was stopped by the Northern Alliance forces near the city of Bamian.” He was then handed over — or sold — to US forces. Despite this, the spurious reason for his transfer to Guantánamo on February 7, 2002 was “because of his suspected involvement with the Taliban as a fighter.”

Assessed as being “neither affiliated with AI-Qaida nor a Taliban leader,” he was also regarded as being “of no intelligence value to the United States,” and of posing “a Low Threat to the US, its interests or its allies,” and the Joint Task Force recommended him for “release or transfer to the control of another government for continued detention.” However, because the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) stated that it “requires further investigation to make a threat assessment,” Maj. Gen. Miller noted that, “Until CITF completes additional investigation and conducts an assessment, JTF GTMO and CITF cannot concur on an assessment.” Four months later, Adam was released.

Hamdullah (ISN 456, Afghanistan) Released March 2004

Born in 1974 and described, in his assessment on November 11, 2003, as Mo Amad Gui, he was seized in Pakistan, from a house where he was evidently living, by the Pakistani authorities, “under suspicion of being a Taliban supporter and on weapons possession.” He was allegedly “found to have two AK-47s in his home and a weapons permit signed by the Taliban governor of Kandahar,” and it was also stated that the reason for his transfer to Guantánamo on June 12, 2002 was “because of his suspected involvement with Taliban.” In further analysis, it was stated that he and his brother were “suspected of drug and weapons smuggling that supported the Taliban directly,” but that, “When questioned concerning these issues [he had] not been forthright and [had] repeatedly been found deceptive.”

Because of this perceived deception, the Task Force stated that he had “not been fully exploited.” As a result, he was recommended for ongoing detention. Although he was “assessed as not being a member of Al-Qaida nor a Taliban leader,” he was regarded as being “of intelligence value to the United States,” and of posing “a medium threat to the US, its interests and its allies” (and the Criminal Investigative Task Force, which, “pursuant to an agreement,” defers to JTF GTMO’s assessment, categorised him as a low risk”). Despite the assessments, he was released just four months later.

Redouane Chekhouri (ISN 499, Morocco) Released July 2004

Born in 1972, he was described, in his assessment on January 3, 2004, as Radwan Shakouri, and was recommended for continued detention, on the basis that he was “of high intelligence value to the United States,” and “pose[d] a medium risk as he may possibly pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.” Nevertheless, he was released just six months later, along with four other Moroccans, including Mohammed Ouzar (ISN 133), profiled in Part One.

Redouane Chekhouri is the brother of Younis Chekhouri (ISN 197), described here as Ahmad Abdullah Al-Wazan, who is still held, and most of his perceived significance was based on the disputed allegations against his brother. It was claimed that his brother suggested that they (Redouane, Younis and Younis’ wife) traveled to Damascus, Syria to look for work, and that when they couldn’t find any work in Syria, Younis “suggested they try to do relief work in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.” As a result, they traveled overland to Jalalabad, via Iran, where they “went to work with the detainee’s niece’s husband, Abu Ahmad,” described as “a purported member of the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (MIFG),” for approximately four months. After the US-led invasion, Redouane was injured during the bombing of Jalalabad, and Younis “went to find [his] wife in Pakistan while his brother was laid up because of his injuries.” He reportedly “stayed in an unidentified Afghan’s house for approximately 27 days and was eventually taken to a hospital in Jalalabad, where he was treated for a broken elbow and head wounds.” There he was seized by Northern Alliance soldiers “and taken to a prison in Kabul, where he was incarcerated for approximately one month,” and was then handed over — or sold — to US forces.

He was flown to Guantánamo on April 30, 2002, “because of his knowledge and involvement with the MIFG and the links between family members (Abu Ahmad) and their actions with the MIFG,” according to the reasons for his transfer that were grafted onto his case after the fact, but it remains unclear whether there is any truth to the US authorities’ claims that either of the Chekhouri brothers were involved with the MIFG, aka the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group or, in French, Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM).

On his return to Morocco, Redouane Chekhouri (along with the other ex-prisoners released with him) was put on trial on charges related to terrorism, in a process that involved numerous delays and that concluded in 2007 with his acquittal, which suggests that, in his case, there was no evidence that he was involved with the GICM, even though, in his assessment at Guantánamo, the Joint Task Force stated that he was “claimed by the Moroccan government to be a member of the MIFG,” and that, in addition, “His brother has admitted to being the former military head of the MIFG, and Abu Ahmad has been identified through sensitive information as a member of the MIFG,” and one of [his] other brothers is currently in custody in Italy on charges of recruiting fighters for the Al-Qaida network.”

Emdash Abdullah Turkash (ISN 500, Turkmenistan) Released March 2004

Born in 1935, and therefore 66 years old at the time of his capture, Turkash, who is an Afghan national, and not from Turkmenistan, as claimed in the Pentagon’s records, was assessed on August 16, 2003, when it was stated that he had “been diagnosed with treatable active Tuberculosis and Hepatitis C but [was] otherwise in good health.” It was also stated that he claimed that he was seized by Afghan police in January 2002, in a village in Afghanistan, “because he admitted to being able to speak Arabic.” In addition, it was stated that Turkash claimed that he was “not captured with weapons, equipment, money, passports or documents and that he [was] only a simple ’street person,’ selling honey and fruits on the street.” He was turned over to US forces in Bagram, and the spurious reason given for his transfer to Guantánamo on January 28, 2002 was because of his “suspected knowledge of Arab activities associated with the Taliban regime.”

This was a thin basis for suspicion, and what happened afterwards seemed only to confirm that Guantánamo existed primarily to create reasons for detaining people who had been sent there not for any specific reason, but only because they had somehow ended up in US custody. Turkash was assessed as never having been “forthright or fully cooperative,” but, in what appeared to be a quietly desperate quest for information, the “[t]ransfer team analysed detainee information and concluded that [he] had knowledge of extremist activities in Saudi Arabia and was deported from SA, along with his entire family because of his family connections to Islamic extremism.” Turkash denied this, acknowledging that he had lived in Saudi Arabia “for over 55 years,” but denying “knowledge of extremist activities.”

It was, moreover, claimed, without much confidence, that he “may have son’s [sic] who are Al-Qaida members and one son may be identifiable with a senior Al-Qaida leader in Chechnya,” and, in conclusion, the Joint Task Force assessed him as “having knowledge of extremist personalities connected to AI-Qaida and may have a son who is an Al-Qaida commander,” even though, in a crucial passage, it was noted that, “Despite repeated efforts to ascertain any information concerning this detainee from the Saudi government, none has been provided and therefore no evidence exists to support this detainee’s continued detention in Guantánamo Bay.”

As a result, he was assessed as being “of low intelligence value to the United States at this time,” and of posing “a medium threat risk to the US, its interests and allies because of his potential connections to Al-Qaida members,” and Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for transfer to the control of another government for continued detention,” with the Task Force’s additional suggestion that, “During detention and additional interrogation in Afghanistan, sources not available now may be available in the future to provide additional intelligence” about him.

Aminulla Amin (ISN 504, Pakistan) Released September 2004

He was born “in approximately 1973,” according to his assessment on July 9, 2003, in which it was stated that his name was Amin Allah Amin, and that he had been “diagnosed with latent tuberculosis and chronic active Hepatitis B,” even though it was also claimed that he was “otherwise in good health.” In addition, the Joint Task Force claimed that, although he was reportedly born in Chaman, Pakistan, “new information states he might have been born in Saudi Arabia or Yemen.”

This, in fact, seem to be a clear example of how, in their desire to justify who was being held at Guantánamo, the authorities ended up clutching wildly at implausible straws. Amin himself stated that he had been seized by agents of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence directorate (the notorious ISI), while “standing and talking in front of a sidewalk cafe” in the border town of Chaman on December 20, 2001. “Someone,” the report continues, “identified [him] as a possible Taliban affiliate while he claims he was just a teacher,” deliberately misidentified by an “unknown person” who “held a grudge against him or his tribe.” In addition, he explained that he “could have bought his release by paying 100,000 Rupees (about US $1,670)” to ISI officials, which was “how many Taliban bought their release,” because “it was common knowledge that the ISI solicited and accepted bribes from prisoners.”

This whole scenario provides a perfectly plausible explanation for how Amin ended up at Guantánamo (as well as a startling insight into the everyday corruption of the ISI), and the spurious reasons for his transfer to Guantánamo on May 2, 2002 were that he had “knowledge of specific information regarding residences and the possible hiding locations of former Taliban officials in Chaman.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended him for release or transfer on December 14, 2002, but by the time of this assessment, seven months later, he had been “identified through a sensitive source as being a Saudi national and a known Tier-II member of Al-Qaida” (which was nonsense), and had also been “‘recognized’ by an associate affiliated with Al-Qaeda,” who, nevertheless (and this should have set alarm bells ringing), “did not know his name or any further information concerning” him.

In a third piece of supposed evidence contradicting Amin’s story, a Sudanese prisoner seized after the Qala-i-Janghi massacre in northern Afghanistan in November 2001 said that Amin was “a person he recognised from the prison in Kandahar.” According to the Joint Task Force, this claim “potentially places the detainee in Afghanistan during the later days of the campaign against the Taliban and calls into question the detainee’s statements and credibility,” even though, to anyone with a modicum of skepticism, it did no such thing, and merely demonstrated instead what happens when prisoners are randomly prevailed upon to tell stories about people whose photographs they are shown while being interrogated in sessions in which the threat of violence is ever present.

In spite of these obvious caveats, Amin was reassessed as “affiliated with Al-Qaida” and “a serious threat to the United States,” who “should be detained for further intelligence purposes,” and it was also stated that he “possesses a high confirmed threat to the US, its interests and its allies.” It took around a year for someone in authority to realise that he was not a Saudi, and that all of the above was nonsense, leading to his release in September 2004.

Sultan Mohammed (ISN 517, Afghanistan) Released May 2003

Born in 1977, he was described, in his assessment on January 18, 2003, as Sulran Mohamed, from Helmand province, and it was also noted that, as well as having latent tuberculosis, in common with the majority of the Afghan prisoners, he also had “frequent migraine headaches, and suffer[ed] from partial hearing loss due to loud explosions in the war.” In terms of justifying his detention, it was stated that, in October 2001, while he was traveling to purchase medicine, “several Taliban soldiers forcibly conscripted him into Taliban service, claiming that he would be allowed to leave with pay after serving three months.” He was then taken to a combat position in Baghlan province, where he remained until his capture two months later, and where it was noted that, “Although he did receive limited weapons training along with other conscripts, his duties primarily consisted of posting guard and repairing meals.” He was captured after fleeing with his group, and the spurious reason for sending him to Guantánamo, on January 11, 2002 (the day the prison opened), was because of his supposed knowledge of various Taliban figures, including the mayor of his region, and his commander in the field.

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [517] is assessed as neither affiliated with Al-Qaida nor as being a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [He] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations or in the course of his detention. Based on the above, detainee does not pose a future threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Khirullah Akah (ISN 518, Afghanistan) Released November 2003

Born in 1977 and described, in his assessment on June 21, 2003, as Khir Ullah, he was apparently “a poppy farmer prior to being selected as one of several young men chosen by his village elder to serve in the Taliban” in the fall of 1999. As a conscript, he was “required to serve for three months of the year for three successive years,” and in his third year, when he was captured en route from Baghlan to Kabul, like Sultan Mohammed, above, he apparently “served as a recruiter,” who “recruited and was in charge of a squad of 13 people to fight with him.” The spurious reason given for his transfer to Guantánamo, on May 2, 2002, was “because of his knowledge of Taliban facilities in Kandahar, Taliban fighters in Baghlan, and the Taliban leadership in the Baghlan and Balkh regions.”

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [518] is assessed as being neither affiliated with Al-Qaida nor a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [He] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations or in the course of his detention. Based on the above, detainee poses a low threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Abdul Karim (ISN 520, Afghanistan) Released May 2003

Born in 1982, it was noted, in his assessment on September 3, 2002, that he claimed that Taliban members “forcibly took him” from his village “for a three-month conscription period,” and that, on November 13, 2001, “when Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif were being captured by the Northern Alliance, his two masters transported [him] to Kabul, where they were subsequently captured by Northern Alliance forces.” Later transferred to US forces, he arrived in Guantánamo on June 12, 2002, on the spurious basis of “his possible knowledge of a Taliban facility in Pol-e-Khumri,” in Baghlan province.

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that it “consider[ed] the information obtained from and about him as not valuable or tactically exploitable,” and added, “Based on current information, detainee [520] is assessed as not affiliated with Al-Qaida and was not being a Taliban leader [sic]. Moreover … the detainee has no further intelligence value to the United States and will not be seen for further intelligence purposes. [B]ased upon all of the foregoing, and the fact that [he] has not expressed thoughts of violence nor made threats toward the US or its allies during interrogations, or in the course of his detention. he is not considered a threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Michael Dunlavey recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government.”

Ataullah Adam Gul (ISN 525, Afghanistan) Released March 2004

Born in 1983 and described, in his assessment on November 12, 2003, as Towala Alam Gul, he told his interrogators that he was an Afghan who had “moved to Pakistan to study religion, with his family’s blessing and support,” and had “spent three years near Quetta, studying at different mosques.” After 9/11, amid “rumors that the Taliban would be attacked by the United States,” he apparently traveled by car to Afghanistan with five other people, was captured near Kandahar and taken to Nahrin, in Baghlan province, where, in his words, he “volunteered” to fight with the Taliban, although he also claimed that, after two months’ training, he ” was allowed to go to a bazaar late at night in Nahrin, where he decided to escape, and head for home.” According to his account, however, he was recaptured and sent back to Nahrin, where “he was whipped and told that his punishment would be much harsher if he tried to leave again.”

After resuming his duties, which apparently consisted of working as a guard, he was taken by truck towards Kabul, as American bombers attacked, but was captured by Northern Alliance forces, who “held him in custody for two months before handing him over to American forces.” He arrived in Guantánamo on June 15, 2002 (although it was listed as 2003).

In its assessment, the Joint Task Force stated that he was “assessed as not being a member of Al-Qaida or a Taliban leader. Moreover … the detainee is of no intelligence value to the United States [and] poses a low threat to the US or US interests.” As a result, Maj. Gen. Miller recommended that he be “considered for release or transfer to the control of another government for continued detention.”

Parts Four and Five To Follow

the unknown prisoners

Assange Awarded Sydney Peace Prize.

It seems the Sydney Peace Prize is more significant these days than the Noble Peace Prize. Whereas the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded to a President who does little other than break promises and further war in the name of 'peace', the Sydney Peace Prize is awarded for "exceptional courage in pursuit of human rights." Something the aforesaid President ias unlikely to get.

The founder of Wikileaks, Julian Assange, is the latest recipient for this price for the very same, "exceptional courage in pursuit of human rights".

Assange received the gold medal in London on 10 May. Previous recipients of the medal have included the Dalai Lama and Nelson Mandela so he is in good company there.

"For 14 years we’ve awarded the Sydney Peace Prize, but only on three occasions in 14 years have made an exception to the rule and awarded a gold medal for ‘exceptional courage in pursuit of human rights,'” Sydney Peace Foundation director, Stuart Rees, said at the event according to a report from London's Frontline Club.

"By challenging centuries-old practices of government secrecy and by championing people's right to know, WikiLeaks and Julian Assange have created the potential for a new order in journalism and in the free flow of information," Rees said in a statement issued by the foundation.

"Instead of demonising an Australian citizen who has broken no law, the Australian Government must stop shoring up Washington's efforts to behave like a totalitarian state. The treatment of alleged whistleblower Bradley Manning confirms a US administration at odds with their commitment to universal human rights and intent on militaristic bullying."

Private Bradley Manning's Address

You can write letters of suppport to Private Bradley manning at the following address:

Bradley Manning 89289
830 Sabalu Road
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Any letters contain any of the following will be rejected:

Solicitations for gambling/lottery, business or pen pal correspondence.
Blackmail, threats or indecent subject matter
Plans or plots for escape
Codes

Bradley moved to avoid writ?

Fronm: The Register.

'We'll do what we like', Marines reportedly told doc
By Lewis Page • Get more from this author

Imprisoned US soldier Private Bradley Manning, who is charged with leaking huge amounts of classified data from military computer systems, is now under a much less severe confinement regime.

Manning's lawyer, David Coombs (a former Army judge and reserve Lieutenant-Colonel) reports in a recent blog post that his client's move from the US Marine jail at Quantico, Virginia (known as the "brig" in accordance with the Marines' nautical traditions) to the main US Army prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has resulted in a considerable improvement in quality of life.

At Quantico, Manning was held in solitary in his cell for 23 hours each day, had very limited access to reading material, was frequently awakened at night and compelled to strip before going to bed.

By contrast at Leavenworth he has a window giving natural light, a more comfortable cell with a desk, reading materials, pen and paper etc, and doesn't have his clothing taken away at night. He is confined to his cell for nine hours only at night, having access to a common area used by other pre-trial detainees for the rest of the day where there is a TV and an exercise treadmill. Manning and the other pre-trial inmates eat their meals in a cafeteria and get a two-hour outdoor exercise break. There is also access to a library and an indoor rec area.

Manning is also allowed to receive mail at Leavenworth: Coombs gives the address.

According to Coombs, the move to Leavenworth may have been motivated by intransigence on the part of Marine commanders at Quantico regarding their decisions to put Manning under maximum-security confinement and to deem him a personal-injury/suicide risk. These decisions together made his imprisonment in the brig much more arduous than it would otherwise have been.

Coombs writes:

The defense recently received reliable reports of a private meeting ... involving high-level Quantico officials where it was ordered that PFC Manning would remain in maximum custody and under prevention of injury watch indefinitely ... When challenged by a Brig psychiatrist present at the meeting that there was no mental health justification for the decision, the senior Quantico official issuing the order responded, "We will do whatever we want to do".

Coombs says he was in the process of preparing a writ of habeas corpus seeking a court ruling that the Marines' confinement regime violated Manning's rights to due process. He planned to cite a previous case in which the Marine Corps had illegally used maximum-security custody as a form of punishment.

Coombs suggests that the move to Leavenworth was motivated by a desire to avoid this writ.

"The news of the move came as a surprise to the defense [but] the timing did not," he writes, adding that he intends "to pursue redress at the appropriate time for the flagrant violations of [Manning's] constitutional rights by the Quantico confinement facility".

It's widely believed that the files Manning is accused of leaking were passed to the WikiLeaks website – in fact that they have made up almost all the site's interesting material in recent times (Iraq and Afghan "war logs", secret diplomatic cable trove, Baghdad gunship vids). However it appears that US investigators are having difficulty establishing court-worthy proof of this – which would be necessary to make a case against WikiLeaks for espionage – and thus far no US legal moves have been made against WikiLeaks or its colourful chief Julian Assange.

At the moment Assange remains on bail in the UK facing extradition to Sweden, where prosecutors want to question him regarding accusations of sexual offences made by women there.

Copyright Lewis Page

President Obama Makes a Fair Trial of Bradley Manning Impossible By Declaring Him Guilty

From Michael Moore's Page.

By Kevin Zeese

Kevin Zeese is an attorney. He directs the anti-war group Come Home America and serves on the steering committee of the Bradley Manning Support Network.



"The credibility of the military justice system is being undermined by the prosecution of Bradley Manning. His abusive punishment without trial violates his due process rights; his harsh treatment in solitary confinement-torture conditions violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; and now the commander-in-chief has announced his guilt before trial making a fair trial impossible. A Bradley Manning exception to the Bill of Rights is developing as the Obama administration seeks Manning’s punishment no matter what constitutional protections they violate.

On Thursday April 21, 2011 in San Francisco a group of Bradley Manning supporters protested the prosecution of Manning at a Barack Obama fundraising event. One of Manning’s supporters was able to question the president directly afterwards and during the conversation, Obama said on videotape that Manning was guilty.

Can you imagine if the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamene’i, pronounced an Iranian military whistle blower “guilty” before any trial was held? Khamene’i is the commander-in-chief of all armed forces in Iran, just as President Obama is the commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed services. Would anyone in the United States think that a trial before Iranian military officers that followed such a pronouncement could be fair? The U.S. government would use the situation to make propaganda points about the phony justice system in Iran.

President Obama’s pronouncement about Manning, “He broke the law,” amounts to unlawful command influence – something prohibited in military trials because it is devastating to the military justice system. Manning will be judged by a jury of military officers in a military court where everyone involved follows the orders of the commander-in-chief. How are these officers going to rule against their commander-in-chief, especially after Manning has been tortured in solitary confinement for almost a year? Any officer who finds Manning “not guilty” will have no chance of advancing his career after doing so.

Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes undue command influence unlawful. Unlawful Command Influence has been called “the carcinoma of the military justice system” and is often described as “the mortal enemy of military justice.” The importance of the command structure in the military makes command influence a threat to fair trails, i.e. “because the inherent power and influence of command are necessary and omnipresent facets of military life, everyone involved in both unit command and in military justice must exercise constant vigilance to protect against command influence becoming unlawful.”

Accordingly, “Unlawful Command Influence occurs when senior personnel, wittingly or unwittingly, have acted to influence court members, witnesses, or others participating in military justice cases. Such unlawful influence not only jeopardizes the validity of the judicial process, it undermines the morale of military members, their respect for the chain of command, and public confidence in the military.” Further, even: “The ‘appearance of unlawful command influence is as devastating to the military justice system as the actual manipulation of any given trial.’” The commander-in-chief announcing guilt before trial is an unprecedented case of unlawful command influence.

When unlawful command influence occurs a heavy burden is put on the prosecution to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the facts upon which the unlawful command influence is based are untrue; (2) those facts do not constitute unlawful command influence; or (3) the unlawful command influence will not affect the proceedings.” Since President Obama is on videotape announcing the finding of guilt it will be impossible to prove either of the first two points. To prove the third point will require the court to enter into a charade where officers claim they are not influenced by the commander-in-chief. In reality, the president announcing the guilt of Manning before he is tried will influence every officer who wants to continue to advance in his or her career. And, since Manning has already been punished severely before trial officers will be even less likely to find Manning not guilty because that would raise questions about his abusive treatment.

Military case law indicates that “pretrial publicity itself may constitute unlawful command influence.” When the president speaks it results in national media attention (see a google search for “Obama Manning guilty” produced 1.5 million stories by April 24th). Of course, the president’s statement of Manning’s guilt was not the only pre-trial publicity in Manning’s case. In addition, the brutal treatment Manning has received during pre-trial detention has also received widespread media attention. The combination of this mistreatment and the president’s statements shows that the military from the Quantico command to the commander-in-chief saw Manning as guilty and wanted him punished harshly.

Military courts have held over and over that if unlawful command influence is proven then dismissal of the case is appropriate. (See United States v. Douglas, 68 M.J. 349 (2010) and the cases cited therein.) “[D]ismissal of charges is appropriate when an accused would be prejudiced or no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings.” There is no question Manning has been prejudiced and it is hard to imagine how the proceedings can be cleansed of this unlawful command influence so there is no useful purpose in continuing.

The White House made an inept attempt to try and change the obvious meaning of the president’s statement. Politico reports: “White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said Obama was in fact making a general statement that did not go specifically to the charges against Manning. ‘The president was emphasizing that, in general, the unauthorized release of classified information is not a lawful act,’ he said Friday night. ‘He was not expressing a view as to the guilt or innocence of Pfc. Manning specifically.’” This clarification is inept because Obama was quite specific in his comments saying: “He broke the law.”

Unlawful command influence causes “exceptional harm . . . to the fairness and public perception of military justice when it does arise” This harm is magnified in the case of Bradley Manning because of the severe mistreatment he has received in Quantico before even being tried. This is a case where punishment in Quantico and a finding of guilt by the commander-in-chief both came before trial. The sooner this prosecution ends the less damage that will be done to the reputation of the military justice system."

Obama’s constitutional law professor joins group calling Manning’s treatment illegal

Nearly 300 experts, scholars and authors demand an end to Manning's rough treatment

The Harvard professor who taught President Barack Obama about America's founding document has added his name to a letter damning the treatment of U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning, the lone soldier accused of leaking a vast number of government secrets to anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks.

Harvard Constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe, who quit his post as an adviser to the Obama administration about three months ago, is just one of nearly 300 of the nation's top legal minds and other experts to sign an open letter calling on the government to treat Bradley Manning as it does other prisoners.

Manning has been held in solitary confinement in the Quantico military brig since July. He gets one hour of exercise per-day, must be checked by guards every five minutes and is forced to sleep naked and undergo a nude inspection every morning. Critics of this treatment say it amounts to torture and an illegal punishment for an American who has not been convicted of a crime.

Tribe wrote that Manning's treatment "violates his person and his liberty without due process of law and in the way it administers cruel and unusual punishment of a sort that cannot be constitutionally inflicted even upon someone convicted of terrible offenses, not to mention someone merely accused of such offenses".

"Private Manning has been designated as an appropriate subject for both Maximum Security and Prevention of Injury (POI) detention," the open letter explained. "But he asserts that his administrative reports consistently describe him as a well-behaved prisoner who does not fit the requirements for Maximum Security detention. The brig psychiatrist began recommending his removal from Prevention of Injury months ago. These claims have not been publicly contested. In an Orwellian twist, the spokesman for the brig commander refused to explain the forced nudity “because to discuss the details would be a violation of Manning’s privacy.”

The letter also cites former U.S. State Dept. spokesman P.J. Crowley, who called the treatment of Manning "counterproductive and stupid," suggesting it may make prosecuting the soldier even more difficult. Crowley resigned his post after criticizing the administration's handling of the case.

"If Manning is guilty of a crime, let him be tried, convicted, and punished according to law," the open letter continues. "But his treatment must be consistent with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. There is no excuse for his degrading and inhumane pretrial punishment."

The document was authored by Bruce Ackerman, of Yale Law School, and Yochai Benkler, of Harvard Law School. It had 295 co-signers at the time of this story's publication.

The full letter and list of distinguished signatories appears below. It was first published by The New York Review of Books.

####

Private Manning’s Humiliation

Bradley Manning is the soldier charged with leaking US government documents to Wikileaks. He is currently detained under degrading and inhumane conditions that are illegal and immoral.

For nine months, Manning has been confined to his cell for twenty-three hours a day. During his one remaining hour, he can walk in circles in another room, with no other prisoners present. He is not allowed to doze off or relax during the day, but must answer the question “Are you OK?” verbally and in the affirmative every five minutes. At night, he is awakened to be asked again “Are you OK?” every time he turns his back to the cell door or covers his head with a blanket so that the guards cannot see his face. During the past week he was forced to sleep naked and stand naked for inspection in front of his cell, and for the indefinite future must remove his clothes and wear a “smock” under claims of risk to himself that he disputes.

The sum of the treatment that has been widely reported is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against punishment without trial. If continued, it may well amount to a violation of the criminal statute against torture, defined as, among other things, “the administration or application…of… procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality.”

Private Manning has been designated as an appropriate subject for both Maximum Security and Prevention of Injury (POI) detention. But he asserts that his administrative reports consistently describe him as a well-behaved prisoner who does not fit the requirements for Maximum Security detention. The brig psychiatrist began recommending his removal from Prevention of Injury months ago. These claims have not been publicly contested. In an Orwellian twist, the spokesman for the brig commander refused to explain the forced nudity “because to discuss the details would be a violation of Manning’s privacy.”

The administration has provided no evidence that Manning’s treatment reflects a concern for his own safety or that of other inmates. Unless and until it does so, there is only one reasonable inference: this pattern of degrading treatment aims either to deter future whistleblowers, or to force Manning to implicate Wikileaks founder Julian Assange in a conspiracy, or both.

If Manning is guilty of a crime, let him be tried, convicted, and punished according to law. But his treatment must be consistent with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. There is no excuse for his degrading and inhumane pretrial punishment. As the State Department’s P.J. Crowley put it recently, they are “counterproductive and stupid.” And yet Crowley has now been forced to resign for speaking the plain truth.

The Wikileaks disclosures have touched every corner of the world. Now the whole world watches America and observes what it does, not what it says.

President Obama was once a professor of constitutional law, and entered the national stage as an eloquent moral leader. The question now, however, is whether his conduct as commander in chief meets fundamental standards of decency. He should not merely assert that Manning’s confinement is “appropriate and meet[s] our basic standards,” as he did recently. He should require the Pentagon publicly to document the grounds for its extraordinary actions—and immediately end those that cannot withstand the light of day.

Signed:

Bruce Ackerman, Yale Law School
Yochai Benkler, Harvard Law School

Additional Signatories (institutional affiliation, for identification purposes only):

Jack Balkin, Yale Law School
Richard L. Abel, UCLA Law
David Abrams, Harvard Law School
Martha Ackelsberg, Smith College
Julia Adams, Sociology, Yale University
Kirsten Ainley, London School of Economics
Jeffrey Alexander, Yale University
Philip Alston, NYU School of Law
Anne Alstott, Harvard Law School
Elizabeth Anderson, Philosophy and Women's Studies, University of Michigan
Kevin Anderson, University of California
Scott Anderson, Philosophy, University of British Columbia
Claudia Angelos, NYU School of Law
Donald K. Anton. Australian National University College of Law
Joyce Appleby, History, UCLA
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Princeton University
Stanley Aronowitz, Sociology, CUNY Graduate Center
Jean Maria Arrigo, PhD, social psychologist, Project on Ethics and Art in Testimony
Reuven Avi-Yonah, University of Michigan Law
H. Robert Baker, Georgia State University
Katherine Beckett, University of Washington
Duncan Bell, Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge
Steve Berenson, Thomas Jefferson School of Law
Michael Bertrand, UNC Chapel Hill
Christoph Bezemek, Public Law, Vienna University of Economics and Business
Michael J. Bosia, Political Science, Saint Michael's College
Bret Boyce, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law
Rebecca M. Bratspies, CUNY School of Law
Jason Brennan, Philosophy, Brown University
Talbot Brewer, Philosophy, University of Virginia
John Bronsteen, Loyola University Chicago
Peter Brooks, Princeton University
James Robert Brown, University of Toronto
Sande L. Buhai,Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
Ahmed I Bulbulia, Seton Hall Law School
Susannah Camic, University of Wisconsin Law School
Lauren Carasik, Western New England College School of Law
Teri L. Caraway, University of Minnesota
Alexander M. Capron, University of Southern California, Gould School of Law
Michael W. Carroll, Law American University
Marshall Carter-Tripp, Ph.D, Foreign Service Officer, retired
Jonathan Chausovsky, Political Science, SUNY-Fredonia
Carol Chomsky, University of Minnesota Law School
John Clippinger, Berkman Center for Internet and Society
Andrew Jason Cohen, Georgia State University
Lizabeth Cohen, Harvard University
Marjorie Cohn, Thomas Jefferson School of Law
Doug Colbert, Maryland School of Law
Sheila Collins, William Paterson University
Nancy Combs, William& Mary Law School
Stephen A. Conrad, Indiana University Mauer School of Law
Steve Cook, Philosophy, Utica College
Robert Crawford,Arts and Sciences, University of Washington
Thomas P. Crocker, University of South Carolina
Jennifer Curtin, UCI School of Medicine
Deryl D. Dantzler, Walter F. Gorge School of Law of Mercer University
Benjamin G. Davis, University of Toledo College of Law
Rochelle Davis, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Wolfgang Deckers, Richmond University, London
Michelle M. Dempsey, Villanova University School of Law
Wai Chee Dimock, English, Yale University
Sinan Dogramaci, Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
Zayd Dohrn, Northwestern University
Jason P. Dominguez, Texas Southern University
Judith Donath, Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet and Society
Norman Dorsen, New York University School of Law
Michael W. Doyle, International Affairs, Law and Political Science, Columbia
Bruce T. Draine, Astrophysics, Princeton University
Jay Driskell,History, Hood College
Michael C. Duff, University of Wyoming College of Law
Lisa Duggan, Social and Cultural Analysis, NYU
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Graduate Center,CUNY
Stephen M. Engel, PhD, Political Science, Marquette University
Simon Evnine, Philosophy, University of Miami
Mark Fenster, Levin College of Law, University of Florida
Martha Field, Harvard Law School
Justin Fisher, Philosophy, Southern Methodist University
William Fisher, Harvard Law School
Joseph Fishkin, University of Texas School of Law
Mark Fishman, Sociology, Brooklyn College
Martin S. Flaherty, Fordham Law School
George P. Fletcher, Columbia University, School of Law
John Flood, Law and Sociology, University of Westminster
Michael Forman, University of Washington Tacoma
Bryan Frances, Philosophy, Fordham University
Katherine Franke, Columbia Law School
Nancy Fraser, Philosophy and Politics, New School for Social Research
Eric M. Freedman, Hofstra Law School
Monroe H. Freedman, Hofstra University Law School
Kennan Ferguson, University of Wisconsin, MilWaukee
John R. Fitzpatrick, Philosophy, University of Tennessee/Chattanooga
A. Michael Froomkin, University of Miami School of Law
Gerald Frug, Harvard Law School
Louis Furmanski, University of Central Oklahoma
James K. Galbraith, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin
Herbert J Gans, Columbia University
William Gardner, Pediatrics, Psychology,& Psychiatry, The Ohio State University
Urs Gasser, Harvard Law School, Berkman Center for Internet and Society
Julius G. Getman, University of Texas Law School
Todd Gitlin, Columbia University
Bob Goodin, Australian National University
Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, Human Rights, University of Washington
David Golove, NYU School of Law
James R. Goetsch Jr., Philosophy, Eckerd College
Thomas Gokey, Art and Information Studies, Syracuse University
Robert W. Gordon, Yale Law School
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Albany Law School
Mark A. Graber, University of Maryland School of Law
Jorie Graham, Harvard University
Roger Green, Pol. Sci. and Pub. Admin., Florida Gulf Coast
Daniel JH Greenwood, Hofstra University School of Law
Christopher L. Griffin, Visiting, Duke Law School
James Grimmelmann, New York Law School
James Gronquist,Charlotte School of Law
Jean Grossholtz, Politics, Mount Holyoke College
Lisa Guenther, Philosophy, Vanderbilt University
Christopher Guzelian, Thomas Jefferson School of Law
Gillian K. Hadfield, Law, Economics, University of Southern California
Jonathan Hafetz, Seton Hall University School of Law
Lisa Hajjar, University of California - Santa Barbara
Susan Hazeldean, Robert M. Cover Fellow, Yale Law School
Dirk t. D. Held, Classics, Connecticut College
Kevin Jon Heller, Melbourne Law School
Lynne Henderson, UNLV--Boyd School of Law (emerita)
Stephen Hetherington, Philosophy, University of New South Wales
Kurt Hochenauer, University of Central Oklahoma
Lonny Hoffman, Univ of Houston Law Center
Michael Hopkins, MHC International Ltd
Nathan Robert Howard, St. Andrews
Marc Morjé Howard, Government, Georgetown University
Kyron Huigens, Cardozo School of Law
Alexandra Huneeus, University of Wisconsin Law School
David Ingram, Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago
David Isenberg, Isen.com
Sheila Jasanoff, Harvard Kennedy School
Christopher Jencks, Harvard Kennedy School
Paula Johnson, Alliant International University
Robert N. Johnson, Philosophy, University of Missouri
Albyn C. Jones, Statistics, Reed College
Lynne Joyrich, Modern Culture and Media, Brown University
David Kairys, Beasley Law School
Eileen Kaufman, Touro Law Center
Kevin B. Kelly, Seton Hall University School of Law
Antti Kauppinen, Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin
Randall Kennedy, Harvard Law School
Daniel Kevles, Yale University
Heidi Kitrosser, University of Minnesota Law School
Gillian R. Knapp, Princeton University
Seth F. Kreimer University of Pennsylvania Law School
Alex Kreit, Thomas Jefferson School of Law
Stefan H. Krieger, Hofstra University School of Law
Mitchell Lasser, Cornell Law School
Mark LeBar, Philosophy, Ohio University
Brian Leiter, University of Chicago
Mary Clare Lennon, Sociology, The Graduate Center, CUNY
George Levine,Rutgers University
Sanford Levinson, University of Texas Law School
Margaret Levi, Pol. Sci., University of Washington and University of Sydney
Tracy Lightcap, Political Science, LaGrange College
Daniel Lipson, Political Science, SUNY New Paltz
Stacy Litz, Drexel University
Fiona de Londras, University College Dublin, Ireland
John Lunstroth, University of Houston Law Center
David Luban, Georgetown University Law Center
Peter Ludlow, Philosophy, Northwestern University
Cecelia Lynch, University of California
David Lyons, Boston University
Colin Maclay, Harvard University, Berkman Center
Joan Mahoney, Emeritus, Wayne State University Law School
Chibli Mallat, Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School
Phil Malone, Harvard Law School
Jane Mansbridge, Harvard Kennedy School
Jeff Manza, Sociology, New York University
Dan Markel, Florida State University
Daniel Markovits, Yale Law School
Richard Markovits, University of Texas Law School
Michael R. Masinter, Nova Southeastern University
Ruth Mason, University of Connecticut School of Law
Rachel A. May, University of South Florida
Jamie Mayerfeld, Political Science, University of Washington
Diane H. Mazur, University of Florida Levin College of Law
Jason Mazzone, Brooklyn Law School
Jeff McMahan, Philosophy, Rutgers University
Richard J. Meagher Jr., Randolph-Macon College
Agustín José Menéndez, Universidad de León and University of Oslo
Hope Metcalf, Yale Law School
Frank I. Michelman, Harvard University
Gary Minda, Brooklyn Law School
John Mikhail, Georgetown University Law Center
Gregg Miller, Political Science, University of Washington
Eben Moglen, Columbia Law School and Software Freedom Law Center
Immanuel Ness, Brooklyn College, City University of New York
Charles Nesson, Harvard University
Joel Ngugi, Law, African Studies, University of Washington
Ralitza Nikolaeva, ISCTE Business School, Lisbon University Institute
John Palfrey, Harvard Law School
James Paradis, Comparative Media Studies, MIT
Emma Perry, London School of Economics and Political Science
Charles Pigden, University of Otago
Adrian du Plessis, Wolfson College, Cambridge University
Patrick S. O'Donnell, Philosophy, Santa Barbara City College
Hans Oberdiek, Philosophy, Swarthmore College
Duane Oldfield, Political Science, Knox College
Michael Paris, Political Science, The College of Staten Island (CUNY)
Philip Pettit, University Professor of Politics and Human Values, Princeton
Frank A. Pasquale, Seton Hall Law School
Matthew Pierce, University of North Carolina
Charles Pigden, Philosophy, University of Otago
Leslie Plachta, MD MPH, Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Thomas Pogge, Yale University
Giovanna Pompele, University of Miami
Joel Pust, Philosophy, University of Delaware
Ulrich K. Preuss, Law& Politics, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin
Margaret Jane Radin, University of Michigan and emerita, Stanford University
Aziz Rana, Cornell University Law School
Gustav Ranis, Yale University
Rahul Rao, School of Oriental& African Studies, University of London
Calair Rasmussen, Affiliation: Political Science, University of Delaware
Daniel Ray, Thomas M. Cooley Law School
Jeff A. Redding, Saint Louis University School of Law
C. D. C. Reeve, Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Bryan Register, Philosophy, Texas State University
Robert B. Reich, University of California, Berkeley
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
John A. Robertson, University of Texas Law School
Corey Robin, Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center
Clarissa Rojas, CSU Long Beach
Kermit Roosevelt, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law, Political Science, Yale University
Norm Rosenberg, History, Macalester College
Clifford Rosky, University of Utah
Brad R. Roth, Poli. Sci. and Law, Wayne State University
Barbara Katz Rothman, Sociology, City University of New York
Bo Rothstein Political Science, University of Gothenburg
Laura L. Rovner,University of Denver College of Law
Donald Rutherford,Philosophy, University of California, San Diego
Leonard Rubenstein, JD, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Chester M. Rzadkiewicz, History, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
DeWitt Sage, Flimmaker
Cindy Skach, Comparative Government and Law, Oxford
William J. Talbott, Philosophy, University of Washington
Natsu Taylor Saito, Georgia State University College of Law
Dean Savage, Queens College, Sociology, CUNY
Kent D. Schenkel, New England Law
Kim Scheppele, Princeton Univeristy
Ben Schoenbachler, Psychiatry, University of Louisville
Jeffrey Schnapp, Harvard University
Kenneth Sherrill, Political Science, Hunter College
Claire Snyder-Hall, George Mason University
Jeffrey Selbin, Yale Law School
Wendy Seltzer, Fellow, Princeton Center for Information Technology Policy
Jose M. Sentmanat, Philosophy, Moreno Valley College, California
Omnia El Shakry, History, University of California
Scott Shapiro, Yale University
Stephen Sheehi, Languages, Lit. and Cultures, University of South Carolina
James Silk, Yale Law School
Robert D. Sloane, Boston University School of Law
Ronald C. Slye, Law, Seattle University
Matthew Noah Smith, Philosophy, Yale University
Stephen Samuel Smith, Political Science, Winthrop University
John M. Stewart, Emeritus, Psychology, Northland College
Peter G. Stillman, Vassar College
Alec Stone Sweet, Yale Law School
Robert N. Strassfeld, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, SUNY-Buffalo Law School
Jeanne Theoharis, Brooklyn College of CUNY
Frank Thompson, University of Michigan
Matthew Titolo, West Virginia University College of Law
Massimo de la Torre, University of Hull Law School
John Torpey, CUNY Graduate Center
Vilna Bashi Treitler, Black& Hispanic Studies, Baruch College, City
Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard University
David M. Trubek, University of Wisconsin (emeritus)
Robert L. Tsai, American University, Washington College of Law
Peter Vallentyne, Philosophy, University of Missouri
Joan Vogel, Vermont Law School
Paul Voice, Philosophy, Bennington College
Victor Wallis,Berklee College of Music
David Watkins, Political Science, University of Dayton
Jonathan Weinberg, Wayne State University
Henry Weinstein, Law, Literary Journalism, University of California
Margaret Weir, Political Science,University of California, Berkeley
Christina E. Wells, University of Missouri School of Law
Danielle Wenner, Rice University
Bryan H. Wildenthal, Thomas Jefferson School of Law
Langdon Winner,Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Naomi Wolf, author
Lauris Wren, Hofstra Law School
Elizabeth Wurtzel, Attorney and author
Betty Yorburg, Emerita, City University of New York
Benjamin S. Yost, Philosophy, Providence College
Jonathan Zasloff, UCLA School of Law
Michael J. Zimmer, Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago
Lee Zimmerman, English, Hofstra University
Mary Marsh Zulack, Columbia Law School


From: The Raw story